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ABSTRACT
The di!erence between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in
many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite di!erent roles,
in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of
psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what
way, or ways, do perception and cognition di!er? The paper reviews recent
work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition
have been held to di!er are discussed. First, their phenomenal character, such as
the often-remarked vivacity or immediacy of perception. Second, the way in
which they represent the world, e.g. the non-propositional nature of the
contents, or non-discursive character of the vehicles, that have been held to
characterise perceptual representation. Third, their place in cognitive
architecture, i.e., roughly, in the information-"ow of the mind, such as their
alleged (non-)modularity. Fourth, their mind-world relations, e.g. the way in
which perceptions seem to be tightly causally linked with distal or proximal
stimuli. Against this background, we distinguish some main options for an
account of the perception/cognition distinction, in particular concerning
whether there is one, several, or no interesting and principled distinction(s) to
be drawn here.
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1. Introduction
How does perception di!er from cognition? It seems plain that percep-
tion and cognition di!er; at least, paradigms of each class – seeing a
nearby tree, thinking about dinner options – seem clearly di!erent. But
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giving an account of their di!erence is, perhaps surprisingly, di#cult. This
paper will provide a review of debates on the perception/cognition dis-
tinction. Why, though, care about this distinction?
First, perception and cognition have been assigned quite di!erent
roles. Perceptions have for example been held to justify beliefs without
themselves requiring justi$cation, a privilege rarely extended to mere
beliefs (cf., e.g. Pryor 2000). Perception has been held to enable reference
to particulars (cf. Strawson 1959; Campbell 2002), or provide content to
certain concepts, such as colour concepts (Peacocke 1992), in a way in
which thought alone could not. On the other hand, cognition seems to
enjoy a freedom and "exibility with regards to its objects denied to per-
ception, reaching into the remote past and distant future, the purely
abstract, the $ctional, and arcane theoretical posits.
Second, the question what distinguishes perception from cognition con-
nects with that of where the border between them lies. In debates on high-
level perception, it is agreed that suitably skilled perceivers quickly and
e!ortlessly can spot the natural kinds (Siegel 2010), meanings (cf., e.g.
Dro!d!owicz this issue), emotions or intentions (cf., e.g. Helton 2018), or
even moral properties (cf., e.g. Bergqvist and Cowan 2018) of perceived
objects or events. Yet do these subjects genuinely perceive, or merely
swiftly cognize, these properties? To get a handle on this, we need a grip
on what marks the perceptual as opposed to the cognitive or vice versa.
Third, the distinction is vital also to the grand psychological-cum-phi-
losophical project of charting the basic structure of mind. Will perception
versus cognition turn out to be a joint in psychological nature, e.g. an
in"ection point in cognitive architecture (cf. Fodor 1983) or form of rep-
resentation (cf. Block MS), or a matter of continuity more than of division
(cf., e.g. Clark 2016)?
Finally, the perception/cognition distinction has long loomed large in
Western philosophy. In The Republic, Plato compares sensible objects of
knowledge unfavourably with intelligible ones, and, in Theaetetus, argues
at length that knowledge is not perception. In the Aristotelian, and later
Thomistic, traditions, the distinction is linked with a metaphysical division
between two forms of soul: a sensitive form, shared with brutes, versus a
rational form, which may, perhaps in part, aspire to immortality. The percep-
tion/cognition distinction becomes pivotal in early modern philosophy, with
rationalists and empiricists taking opposing views as to on which of its sides
lie the chief sources and resources of knowledge. However, opposing
parties here sometimes agree in thinking about the di!erence between
sensory and intellectual states as gradations on a scale. Leibniz (1982, 81)
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contrasts sensory representations as confused with intellectual ones as dis-
tinct, while Hume (1739/2000, SB1-2) compares impressions and ideas on
the scales of force and vivacity. Such gradualist conceptions are rejected
by Kant, whose critical philosophy is structured by a basic di!erence in
kind between concepts and intuitions, and between understanding (‘spon-
taneity’) and sensibility (‘receptivity’) as the faculties to which they respect-
ively belong. Prominent streams of post-Kantian thought, e.g. Hegelian,
have laboured to ‘overcome’ this dualism.
While its rich history still animates an interest in the distinction, survey-
ing the relevant traditions is beyond the scope of this review, and we will
focus on contributions from the last $fteen-odd years.
How, though, should the categories of ‘perception’ and ‘cognition’ be
understood as we set out to explore any di!erences? Paradigms on each
side are perhaps clear enough. From perception: seeing the colours and
locations of nearby objects, and kindred low-level perception. From cog-
nition: thinking, reasoning, problem-solving, and planning. As always,
there will be borderline cases. Greater elucidation of the respective cat-
egories of perception and cognition may however facilitate how these
are to be classi$ed. A clear account of what perception and cognition
are is the goal, not the starting point.
Sections 2–5 look at respects in which perceptions and cognitions have
been supposed to di!er. Speci$cally, section 2 considers phenomenology,
section 3 representation, section 4 cognitive architecture, and section 5
mind-world relations.1 Building on this, section 6 seeks to map out some
main options for an account of the perception/cognition distinction.
2. Phenomenal character
One point of entry to the perception/cognition distinction is the way per-
ception and cognition respectively feel to the subject. There is, one might
think, at least in paradigm cases, a di!erence in conscious character here
that is evident from the $rst-person perspective. So, anyway, Hume seems
to have supposed, maintaining that everyone ‘will readily perceive the
di!erence betwixt feeling and thinking’ (Hume 1739/2000, SB1).
One simple view of this sort is that while perception – in the guise of
perceptual experience – has phenomenal character, cognition just lacks
1The review does not purport to be exhaustive. For reasons of space, we set aside, among other things,
the view that perception is linked to speci!c sensory modalities while cognition is amodal (cf, McFar-
land and Cacace 1999; Burge 2010c, 46–47; Burge 2014, 574; and Phillips 2019 for discussion), and the
idea, in McDowell’s in"uential account, that perceptual experience and thought, whilst both concep-
tual, di#er in being respectively passive and active (McDowell 1994, 10–13; McDowell 2019, 391).
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anything of the sort. Thus, cognition would in a dramatic sense have the
features of unforcefulness and unliveliness Hume assigned to ideas.
However, it is now not uncommon to accept that cognition also has
one or another form of phenomenal character, i.e. that there is cognitive
phenomenology, in one or another sense of that term (cf., e.g. Bayne and
Montague 2011). Moreover, even setting that point aside, the simple view
promises a rather unrevealing account of the perception/cognition dis-
tinction, not grounded on any positive feature of cognition, and adverting
to a seemingly rather unspeci$c feature of perception, shared, one might
think, by pains, moods, emotions, etc.
For a more speci$c account of perceptual or cognitive phenomenol-
ogy, allowing for a distinction even if both exist, one might adopt one
or both of two strategies. One might posit either, $rst, phenomenologi-
cally distinctive objects, or intentional contents, of perception (or of
thought), or, second, a distinctive way objects are (re-)presented, or con-
tents entertained, in perception (or, again, in thought).
Montague (this issue, §4) outlines a proposal of the $rst kind,
suggesting that visual experience ‘has its own distinctive content, e.g.
color-shape.’ A related proposal, defended in Thau (2002) and Glüer
(2009) is that vision distinctively represents, not colours, but certain quali-
tatively pregnant appearance properties or looks. Another suggestion in
this vein is that perception distinctively represents very $ne-grained, or
speci$c, properties, be they colours, shapes, or appearance-property
counterparts of the latter (cf. Bourget 2017). These proposals face the
objection that it is possible also to think of the allegedly distinctive prop-
erties in question (cf. Kriegel 2019). One reply here, adopted in various
ways by Thau and Bourget, is that, while it is indeed possible to think
of the properties by description, or by generalising over them, thought
or language cannot achieve direct reference to them. By adverting to a
di!erent, indirect way in which thought concerns the relevant items,
this move has at least a kinship with the second kind of strategy, on
this issue, to which we turn below.
An alternative way to pursue the $rst strategy would be to invoke not
the kinds but the often-remarked richness of the elements presented in
perception. Kriegel (2019) objects that, even if the cognitive content of
us humans is comparatively sparse, we can conceive of beings without
these cognitive limitations yet for whom a phenomenal contrast
remains between perception and cognition; further, the distinction
between sparse and rich is one in degrees, not in kind. One line of
reply here might be to dispute the reliability of the noted conceivability
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claim, or insist that, even the conceived beings are possible, a di!erence
in richness might still make for a phenomenal di!erence between human
thought and perception. Moreover, as Hume’s way of contrasting
impressions and ideas suggest, it might be questioned whether the di!er-
ence could not be one of degrees.
The second strategy, for accounting for a di!erence between percep-
tual and cognitive phenomenology, posits a distinctive way objects are
(re-)presented, or contents entertained, in perception (or thought). This
strategy chimes with the idea that perception and cognition di!er phe-
nomenally in terms of a more direct phenomenal presence of an object
(property instance, event, state of a!airs, etc.) in perceptual experience.
As it is sometimes put, perception is presentational whereas cognition
is representational (cf., e.g. Searle 1983; Chudno! 2018). Or, as Husserl
(1973/1997, 14) put it, objects at which one is directed in perception
are there ‘in person’, unlike how they $gure in thought, imagination, or
recollection. Yet, how is such a di!erence in the mental relation, or direct-
edness, to be understood, more precisely?
One option here would be to advert to an anti-representational, rela-
tional view of perceptual experience. On such a view, perceptual phe-
nomenology is, at least in part, constituted or grounded by a relation of
acquaintance with certain items and their qualities, be they private
sense-data (cf., e.g. Robinson 1994) or public objects or scenes, a
view sometimes referred to as ‘naïve realism’ (cf., e.g. Brewer 2011;
Campbell 2002; Martin 2006; and Travis 2013). If cognition is represen-
tational, and not itself involves acquaintance with such items, its phe-
nomenology (if any) could not be constituted or grounded in the same
way. This idea could alternatively, or additionally, be interpreted as
referring to a di!erence in how the subject is related to the world in
perception and cognition, a suggestion that we will return to in Sec.
5 below. Naive realism implies that hallucinations, where the subject
is not acquainted with public objects or scenes, cannot have the
same kind of phenomenology as perceptions. Hallucinations have, on
such views, instead been understood as states of imagination
(cf. Allen 2015), or de$ned in terms of their indiscriminability from per-
ception (see e.g. Martin 2006). Such disjunctivism is, of course, contro-
versial (cf. e.g. Kriegel 2011).
Another option, open within the framework of a representational view,
is to posit a distinctive attitude, or intentional ‘mode’, of perceptual
experience. Thus Bach (2007) and Recanati (2007) consider a certain cau-
sally self-referential aspect of perception, i.e. its character as of being
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caused (and, perhaps, causally sustained) by the things one is perceiving,
which Searle (1983) takes to be a condition of satisfaction imposed by per-
ceptual content. Bach and Recanati argue that this condition is better
construed as a condition of success imposed by the perceptual mode
(akin to how, say, truth may be a condition of success, or ‘aim’,
imposed by the mode of belief). Recanati (2007, 133) argues this fact
about perceptual mode would elucidate how subjects are aware of the
perceptual nature of their experience. Now, it might be replied that a
content-based causally self-referential condition, as in a mere thought
that, say, Victoria Falls are roaring and are causing this very thought,
does not make objects immediately present to one. Why, then, should
a mode-based condition do so? Kriegel (2019) raises this question, and
also voices doubts concerning whether the sorts of causal-functional-nor-
mative requirements adverted here are apt to be $rst-personally manifest,
in the requisite way.
If neither of the indicated strategies, for accounting for the putatively
manifest di!erence between perceptual and cognitive phenomenology,
yield solid results, all hope might not be lost for the thought that there
really is such a di!erence. As Kriegel (2019) observes, a remaining
option is to treat the di!erence as primitive – as one we cannot informa-
tively account for in terms of other, more speci$c or more fundamental
features of phenomenology.
The phenomenological approach to the perception/cognition distinc-
tion would have a limitation if there can be unconscious perception,
that, as such, could not be distinguished from cognition on phenomeno-
logical grounds (for discussion see, e.g. Phillips and Block (2016), and
Taylor (2020)).
3. Representation
Paradigm cognitions, such as beliefs, are standardly supposed to exemplify a
form of representation that is propositional, conceptual, and discursive
(roughly: language-like). Given this, perceptions would di!er from cognitions
– at least, from such paradigm cognitions as beliefs – if they are either non-
representational (cf., e.g. Travis 2013) or exemplify a non-propositional/-con-
ceptual/-discursive sort of representation. This section concentrates on the
latter option. The notions of non-propositional/-conceptual/-discursive rep-
resentation are, we shall see, subject of various divergent conceptions in
the literature. It is often a delicate matter to keep track of whether discus-
sants are (dis)agreeing or talking at cross purposes.
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3.1. Non-propositionality
If perceptions are representational, they plausibly have propositional
content in at least in some light-weight sense. For one thing, they can
be associated with sets of possible worlds in which they are veridical.
Such sets are propositions, on an unstructured conception (cf. Stalnaker
1998). Recent arguments for the non-propositionality of perception,
due to Burge (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2018) and Block (MS), assume,
however, a more demanding conception of the possession of prop-
ositional content. Operating with a structured view of propositions,
they stress that propositions admit of the kind of structure speci$ed in
propositional and $rst-order logic, of negation, disjunction, conditionals,
universal quanti$cation, etc. There is good evidence to take mental states
to be typed by propositional content, they argue, when there is good evi-
dence that these states manifest representational capacities whose
repertoire includes states with negative, disjunctive, etc. contents.
Good evidence for capacities with such a repertoire paradigmatically
includes (though is not necessarily limited to) behaviours best explain-
able in terms of inferences the validity of which trade on such logical
structures. For example, Chryssipus’s legendary dog, chasing some-
thing, and arriving at a fork in the road, sni!s the one branch, and
then straightaway pursues the other, a behaviour supposedly best
explained by a disjunctive syllogism.
The representational capacities active in perception need not, and so
ought not, Burge and Block argue, be construed as allowing for negative,
disjunctive, conditional, universally quanti$ed, or ditto structure. Block
(MS) points out that, even in cases where a disjunctive representation
might have been expected, perception is undisjunctive. Consider ambig-
uous stimuli, such as the Necker cube. For all the visual cues in this display
indicate, either the one, or the other, of its square sides perpendicular to
the line of slight is closer. Yet vision does not represent such a disjunction;
it "ips from representing the one as closer to representing the other
as such.
It might be objected that we can perceive absences, such as, say, my
laptop’s non-presence on a café table (cf. Farennikova 2013), and that
such perception in e!ect deploys negation. Block (MS) replies such
cases are better construed as a certain representation of emptiness,
lacking semantic structure. Another objection might be that perceptual
content, assuming a ‘generalist’ view, is existentially quanti$ed: it rep-
resents that there are such-and-such things in front of one (cf., e.g.
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Davies 1992). If universal quanti$cation indicates propositional status,
should not existential quanti$cation do so too? Burge (2010a) rejects
the generalist view, however, arguing it is essential to perception that it
purports to refer to individual objects or events. In perception, attribu-
tives such as red or square have a representational function which
con$nes them to representing the property in question in the context
of attributing it to a particular given in a demonstrative or indexical
way: they are con$ned to such elementary, noun-phrase like structures
as that red square. In contrast, it is characteristic of propositional represen-
tation, Burge (2010c) argues, that some attributive therein is not so
con$ned, but can, inter alia, attribute the property to things generalised
over (some red square) or represent the property without making any
positive attribution (that is not red). Again, there is, he argues, no
su#cient reason to think the representational capacities in play in percep-
tion allow for such structural "exibility.
3.2. Non-conceptuality
Evans (1982) introduced the term ‘non-conceptual content’ into recent
debates, arguing that perception and beliefs have, respectively, non-con-
ceptual and conceptual content. On the perhaps most in"uential charac-
terisation, content is conceptual if mentally entertaining it requires
possessing the concepts used in specifying the content, otherwise non-
conceptual.2 Evans linked concept possession with meeting ‘the General-
ity Constraint’ (GC), i.e. with being able to recombine represented
elements in certain systematic ways, e.g. being able to represent the
ball as above the brick if able to represent the brick as above the ball.
Meeting GC is closely related to having the property Fodor dubs systema-
ticity (see, e.g. Fodor 2008).
Now, at least something like systematicity may seem to apply to per-
ceptual representation. If one can see a red square next to a green tri-
angle, then, surely, one can also see a green square next to a red
triangle. It has been argued, however, that perception has, or at least
may well turn out to have, some telling exceptions to systematicity.
Heck (2007) suggests that perceptual representation may operate so
that spatial relations are represented only among objects (represented
as being) fairly close to each other. Now, suppose a and b are fairly
2For discussion of various conceptions of non-conceptual content, see, e.g., Peacocke 1992; Heck 2000;
Speaks 2005.
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close, and b and c, but not a and c. Then, even if a and b are represented
as being, say, equidistant from oneself, and b, say, as behind c, it cannot
be perceptually represented that a is equidistant from oneself with c, or
that a is behind c. In another context, Johnson observes another putative
breach of systematicity in perceptual representation: ‘although I can see
(imagine) a small black box inside of a large glass sphere, I do not think I
can see (imagine) a large glass sphere inside a small black box’ (2004, 131).
The implications of such putative examples for a di!erence between
perception and thought depend on the status and nature of the claim
that the GC, or systematicity, applies to the latter. Evans has been under-
stood to treat GC as an a priori constraint on thought; adopting such a
view, Heck is content to claim that perceptual representation may turn
out to be spatially constrained in the way indicated. Fodor in contrast
holds systematicity to be an empirical law, admitting of certain sorts of
exceptions, as special science laws typically do. On that view, Heck’s
and Johnson’s putative counterexamples would need empirical support,
and, even if they stand, may be treated as, in e!ect, exceptions that
prove the rule. Yet another possible lesson to be drawn from the
examples is illustrated by Johnson (2004, 2015), whose cited point
about perception is advanced as part of a case for a broader scepticism
whether any naturally occurring system of representation, including
thought and natural language, is systematic.3
Mandelbaum (2018) argues perception has, at least in part, conceptual
content, on the ground that perceptually presented items are categorised,
extremely rapidly, under such basic-level categories as car, dog, guitar, etc.
He cites inter alia $ndings that subjects are above chance at telling
whether a sequence of $ve pictures, each presented for a mere 13 ms
(with forwards and backwards masking, to disrupt subsequent
perceptual processing) included a picture of, say, a car. Cognitive, top-
down processes operate too slowly, Mandelbaum argues, to account for
such categorisations.
3.3. Non-discursivity
The leading contenders for non-discursive forms of representation, when
it comes to the characterization of perception, are analog and iconic rep-
resentation. Each of these two terms are understood in divergent ways in
the recent literature.
3On the role of GC for the attribution of non-conceptual content, and the nature of thought, see also
(Beck 2012).
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For ‘analog’, one can distinguish a ‘continuity’ conception, on which
analog systems allow representation to vary (approximately) continuously
along some dimension, and a ‘mirroring’ conception, on which analog
representational vehicles instantiate structures making them isomorphic
to, or at least structure-sensitive ‘mirrors of’, the domain represented
(for example: greater distances among dots on a tube map correlates
with greater distances among stations – and represent relative length
partly in virtue of this correlation).4 The continuity conception can be
set aside here.
Some conceptions of ‘iconic’, e.g. that of Burge (2018) and Block (MS),
make it e!ectively synonymous with ‘analog’ on the mirroring con-
ception. Others treat it as stipulative (Fodor 2007; Clarke 2020), or at
least generally true (Green and Quilty-Dunn 2017; Quilty-Dunn 2020),
that iconic representations meet a certain ‘Picture Principle’, not
implied by analog mirroring, according to which any part of an iconic rep-
resentation represents a part of the scene represented by the whole (for
example, a part of a picture of a lion would represent, say, its nose). There
is also, as we shall see, disagreement whether non-discursive represen-
tations necessarily, or even typically, represents several dimensions,
such as shape, orientation, and colour, in a holistic, bundled-together
manner.
Beck (2019) argues analog perceptual representation would o!er an
attractive explanation of Weber’s law, i.e. the law, roughly, that the just-
noticeable di!erence in a certain magnitude increases as the magnitude
increases; e.g. loud tones must di!er more in loudness to be discriminable
than soft tones. If loudness is analogically represented, the represen-
tations of two loudnesses instantiate a structural correspondence to the
loudnesses: the representational vehicles may be assumed to be more
similar when the loudnesses represented are (contrast the discursive rep-
resentation ‘49,9 dB’, which arguably is more similar to ‘39,9 dB’ than ‘50
dB’). Given that the psychological processes operating on the represen-
tations are noisy, this suggests that, when the ratio between two rep-
resentations shrinks, a di!erence between the loudnesses they
represent will be harder to detect, as Weber’s law predicts.
Another argument for analog perceptual representation adverts to
‘mental rotation’ experiments on imagery (Quilty-Dunn 2020; Block MS).
Shepard and Metzler (1971) found that the time needed to tell whether
two line drawings depict congruent, or mirror-reversed, $gures is
4For this distinction, and references to leading examples of each conception, see (Beck 2019, 331, nt. 23).
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proportional to the degree to which their depicted orientation di!ers. If
the process of ‘mentally rotating’ the imagined $gure operates over rep-
resentations that instantiate some structural correspondence of angular
separation, this $nding arguably makes sense. Since there are reasons
for thinking imagery and perception have the same representational
format, perceptual representation is analog too, or so the present line
of argument concludes.
Green and Quilty-Dunn (Green and Quilty-Dunn 2017; Quilty-Dunn
2020) argue that, although perceptual representation is in part analog,
perceptual object representations (PORs) are discursive. They appeal
inter alia to studies suggesting that perceivers may be able to recall
one dimension of a just-disappeared object, such as its orientation,
without recalling another, such as its colour. Assuming this recall exploits
PORs, PORs would not be iconic, they argue, since iconic representations
are ‘holistic’, in the sense that they represents several dimensions at once,
roughly as some brushstrokes represents hue, brightness, shape, and
orientation of a pictured object (in contrast, the word ‘blue’ represent
colour only). Crudely: if paint-like PORs lingered so as to be accessible
for retrieving orientation, they should also be accessible for retrieving
colour.
Block (MS) agrees the object representations in some of the studies
cited by Green and Quilty-Dunn are discursive, but puts that down to
how these studies place demands on working memory. In vision, prior
to conceptualization in working memory, iconic/analog PORs are in
play. This explains, Block argues, how object-directed and spatially-
directed aspects of perception interact in $ne-grained, proportional
ways, akin to those found in mental rotation experiments. For example,
perceivers are, other things equal, quicker at reacting to features appear-
ing on an attended object than to features appearing on another object
(even when controlling for distance); however, within the boundaries of
an attended object, attention operates spatially in a putatively analog
way: one would be proportionally slower to react to a feature the
further away it appears, on the surface of the object, from an initially
attended location on its surface. If PORs instantiate a structural correspon-
dence to spatial extension, and attentional processes are sensitive to this
feature of PORs, this proportionality makes sense, Block argues. Moreover,
Block objects that Green and Quilty-Dunn’s holism requirement is too
demanding. Though some iconic representations represent several
dimensions in a holistic, bundled-up manner (as paint can), they do not
all have to do so. Whether they do depends on the representational
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capacities or operations that draw on or process the representations in
question, a point also stressed by Burge (2018).
3.4. Perception-style representation outside perception?
The above indicates some reasons o!ered for thinking (or, as the case
may be, doubting) that perception has non-propositional/-conceptual/-
discursive representation. Even if such representation is necessary to or
(partly) constitutive of perception, it is also exclusive thereto? One
ground for doubting this is that imagery arguably exempli$es such rep-
resentation (cf., e.g. Burge 2010a; Phillips 2019), as do cognitive maps
(Peacocke 1992), and forms of ‘core cognition’, such as elementary
numerosity representations (Carey 2009; Beck 2012). If cognitive map-
use is cognitive, or core cognition is (for more on which, see section 4.3
below), non-propositional/-conceptual/-discursive representation would
not separate perception from cognition inclusively understood (though
might still di!erentiate it from such paradigm cognitions as beliefs).
4. Cognitive architecture
The last two sections considered local features of a speci$c mental state to
classify it as either perceptual or cognitive. In this section, we consider
approaches that apply systemically by appeal to a cognitive architecture
that operates with distinctive perceptual and cognitive systems.
4.1. Informational encapsulation
The most well-known architectural perception/cognition distinction holds
that perception is a modularized system, while cognition is not (cf. Fodor
1983). We focus on one core property of modular systems: informational
encapsulation. A modular system is informationally encapsulated in the
sense that it draws on limited and proprietary sources of information,
and distinctive algorithms or computations that operate on that
information.
A defender of an informational encapsulation distinction between per-
ception and cognition needs two claims: (1) perception is informationally
encapsulated, (2) cognition is not informationally encapsulated.5
In defence of (1), Fodor argued, for example, that perceptual illusions,
like the Müller-Lyer, persist even when the agent knows about them. The
5She can accept that there are also other, non-cognitive and non-perceptual modules (e.g. a language
module; Fodor 1983; Mandelbaum 2018, 11).
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perceptual system seems to have no access to cognitive knowledge. Con-
sider also how perceptual systems operate in highly invariable and sys-
tematic ways, e.g. when they construct shape from shading (cf. Quilty-
Dunn 2020). These features have been taken to illustrate that the percep-
tual systems’ access is limited to the state of the sensory organs and a
limited and proprietary store of information that it uses to interpret or
structure that sensory input (which may be stored implicitly in the
system; Burge 2010a, p. 345f; Shea 2015).
In defence of (2), Fodor (1983, 105!) claimed that cognitive systems are
(a) isotropic: in cognition everything can potentially in"uence everything
else, and (b) Quinean: cognitive changes are sensitive to global proper-
ties, such as general plausibility or simplicity. Your beliefs about evolution,
for example, might depend on what you think about astronomy, on your
political convictions, or on how much you value a simple vs a complex
world view.
To argue against the informational encapsulation distinction, one
might, in turn, argue either against (1) or (2) (or both). We discuss
them in turn.
Challengers of (1) often appeal to cases of cognitive penetration (a term
coined by Pylyshyn 1999, who argued against it). Cognitive penetration,
roughly, refers to the idea that an agent’s cognitive states in"uence her
perceptual systems, thus undermining informational encapsulation.6
Early challenges of this types claimed that culturally speci$c perceptual
categories may be learned through infancy (Churchland 1988). More
recently, Siegel (2010) suggests that the acquisition of recognitional
capacities might cognitively penetrate into perception and enable
agents to perceptually represent novel high-level properties such as
being a pine tree. It has been argued that long term e!ects such as
these, though, may be accommodated through perception-internal pro-
cesses of perceptual learning thus saving perceptual encapsulation (Con-
nolly 2019). They also do not violate synchronic informational
encapsulation: at each time the output of the perceptual system would
still only depend on what – at that time – is within perception’s proprie-
tary information store. This would be enough for a defender of the infor-
mational encapsulation distinction.
Whether the perceptual systems are synchronically encapsulated is a
matter of heated debate. Some urge a return to important aspects of
the pre-Fodorian New Look psychology (cf. Bruner 1957 for a review)
6For various conceptions of cognitive penetration see Stokes 2013.
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and appeal to evidence suggesting that cognitive states like knowl-
edge or belief might in"uence e.g. colour perception: believe that
something is a banana and it looks more yellow (Hansen et al. 2006;
Macpherson 2012); believe that’s someone is black and his face looks
darker (Levin and Banaji 2006). Others argue that popular research pro-
grams such as the predictive coding paradigm show the synchronic
penetrability of perception and thus undermine the informational
encapsulation distinction (Clark 2016; Lupyan 2015). In response, Fire-
stone and Scholl (2016) have defended the modularity of perception
by alleging methodological "aws in the experiments attempting to
undermine it. Macpherson (2017) and Drayson (2017) have argued
that predictive coding architectures are, in fact, compatible with the
modularity of perception (see also Hohwy 2013, 124–126). Williams
(this issue) argues against any view aiming to use the predictive
coding paradigm to replace the perception/cognition distinction with
a uni$ed inferential hierarchy.
Let us now turn to challenges to (2): even if perception were
modular, the informational encapsulation distinction would fail if
cognition were also modular. Proponents of massive modularity
(Sperber 2002; Carruthers 2006) have argued that cognition is not
one general purpose system but a tool-box of highly specialized
parts. If this showed that cognition consisted of modules that are
informationally encapsulated in the same sense as perception, then
the informational encapsulation distinction would fail. Yet, many pro-
ponents of massive modularity have a weakened notion of modular-
ity in mind (Sperber 2002; Carruthers 2006). And indeed, at least for
the processes involved in belief $xation, Fodorian isotropy has been
argued to be highly plausible and compatible with some versions of
the massive modularity view (Chiappe 2000; Currie and Sterelny 2000;
Samuels 2006). This would save a version of the informational encap-
sulation distinction. On the other hand, one might argue that
drawing a distinction between perception and belief $xation is not
the same as drawing the perception/cognition distinction. Arguably
some systems are cognitive and yet distinct from the (conceptual-
ized) belief $xation processes: Currie and Sterelny (2000) argue this
with regard to mind-reading; And, arguably, core cognition is infor-
mationally as encapsulated as perception (cf. Spelke 2003, 31). If
so, then the informational encapsulation distinction arguably draws
the distinction in the wrong place.
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4.2. Attention: between perception and cognition
Attention is a mental capacity that is in"uenced by and in"uences both
perception and cognition: attentive listening to something, for
example, is an auditory – perceptual – state that a!ects what you will
come to know, but it is also in turn in"uenced by your intentions and
prior knowledge (Wu 2014; Watzl 2017). Given that attention connects
perceptual and cognitive processing, it prima facie raises doubts about
whether they are separate systems.
The $rst issue in this regard concerns whether the e!ects of attention
on perception undermine its informational encapsulation. Many writers
starting from Pylyshyn (1999) have suggested that it does not, since the
e!ects of attention are merely selective: attention leaves the internal
operations of the perceptual module intact, and operates by either chan-
ging the input to the perceptual systems or how its output is taken up by
cognition. On this conception, attention is an important interface
between the separate systems of perception and cognition.
Yet, recent work shows that attention also a!ects perceptual proces-
sing on all levels: it a!ects tuning curves in the visual cortex (cf Marti-
nez-Trujillo and Treue 2004) and the assignment of object boundaries
(cf. Driver and Baylis 1996); it modulates perceptual precision (Ling, Liu,
and Carrasco 2009), changes priority weights (cf. Serences and Kastner
2014; Watzl 2017) and modulates perceptual appearances of contrast,
size, depth, and others (for a review see Carrasco and Barbot 2019; cf.
Beck and Schneider 2017 for a diverging view). On the basis of such
a!ects, Mole (2015), Wu (2017), and Block (2016, MS) argue that the
e!ects of attention on perception show that it is not informationally
encapsulated (cf. also many commentaries on Firestone and Scholl 2016).
Gross (2017) and Quilty-Dunn (2020) have responded that the way
attention a!ects perception is crucially di!erent from the way cognitive
states in"uence each other: its e!ects are not systematically and coher-
ently content-based (Gross) and are ‘not a form of information access’
(Quilty-Dunn, 2020 342). If that were right, then while attention indeed
lets information "ow from cognition to perception and back, this is
better conceptualized as talk between two fundamentally distinct
systems rather than a form of integration that threatens their distinctness.
One might, though, call this conclusion in question: by changing pri-
ority weights in perception, attention re-structures the input-output func-
tion of the perceptual systems, which is a change to the information
accessed by perception implicitly (cf. Wu 2014; Watzl 2017). The way
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cognitive states a!ect each other is often similarly implicit: your political
convictions, for example, make certain inferences or thoughts more
accessible or salient (cf. Kahan 2012). If cognition is isotropic and
Quinean in this sense (were one cognitive state or a global property in"u-
ences another through e!ects on accessibility relations; cf. Camp 2019 on
‘frames’), then attention might, after all show that there is no deep distinc-
tion in informational encapsulation between perception and cognition.
4.3. Other architectural approaches
The informational encapsulation distinction, while the most popular, is
not the only architectural approach to the perception/cognition distinc-
tion. One might argue that even if perception is not informationally
encapsulated it may still possess distinctive ‘architectural constraints’
(Green 2020): it might have a speci$c and proprietary information
storage (a perceptual database), with speci$c and proprietary algorithms
using that storage (perceptual computations). How interesting and deep
the perception/cognition distinction is, on approaches in this category,
would depend on the di!erence in the architectural constraints on per-
ception and those on cognition.
One approach in this broad family has been mentioned in the litera-
ture: one might point to a cluster of psycho-physical properties that
point to a distinctive style of perceptual computation. These would
include, for example, processes of adaptation that have been claimed
to be ‘essential to how vision works’ (Webster 2015, 547; cf. Fish 2013;
Block 2014) and show a characteristic time course unlike e.g. cognitive
contrast e!ects (see Block MS in response to Helton 2016). Block (MS)
mentions also popout, binocular rivalery, and other markers. On this
approach, the perceptual system is, roughly, identi$ed as what produces
those e!ects. Such broadly operational de$nitions are not unusual in psy-
chology. The approach would also resemble a (homeostatic) property
cluster theory of natural kinds as developed by Boyd (1999) and
applied to perception by Taylor (2020).7
A more developed alternative architectural approach, though, is
Green’s (2020) dimension restriction hypothesis. On this view, perception
but not cognition ‘is constrained to compute over a bounded class of
dimensions’ (ibid.) such as basic perceptual qualities (like size, orientation,
brightness, saturation or speed) together with limited set of perceptual
7Taylor then uses it to argue that alleged cases of unconscious perception are best seen as indeterminate
cases of perception. See also sect. 6.3.
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categories (like facial expression; cf also Mandelbaum 2018). Whether
Green’s hypothesis, in the end, can explain cases like the famous Dalma-
tion dog has been doubted (Block MS). Further, while Green argues that
the modules proposed by proponents of massive modularity are not
dimensionally restricted in this sense, one might wonder whether the
same is true of Spelke’s and Carey’s core cognition systems (see above).
If those came out as dimension restricted and counted as cognitive
(though e.g. Block (MS) argues that they may be better viewed as percep-
tion/cognition hybrids), then Green’s approach might fail to distinguish
perception from at least some forms of cognition.
5. World-Relation
The previous sections aimed at distinguishing perception from cognition
either by such of their respective features as their phenomenology or way
of representing, or by how they relate to each other (e.g. whether they are
encapsulated). Another criterion, though, looks at how perception and
cognition are each connected to the world. The general idea would be
that perception and cognition are related to the world in fundamentally
di!erent ways. A more speci$c version of the idea is that perception o!ers
a particularly strong or intimate connection to the world. This idea could
be motivated by the thought that in perception, the world impinges on
our senses and so is revealed or presented to us. This idea could take
many forms.
In section 2 above we presented theories according to which the
phenomenal character of perception is, at least in part, constituted by a
relation of acquaintance with either private sense-data, or to everyday
objects and/or scenes. There we highlighted the relational character of
the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as a means of dis-
tinguish it from cognition, but one might also emphasise that acquain-
tance is a unique world-relation. According to the Naïve Realist, the
world-relation is an intrinsic feature of perceptual states. A privileged per-
ceptual world-relation could also be motivated by epistemological con-
siderations. For example, Johnston (2006) and Chudno! (2018) claim
that perception, but not cognitive states like beliefs, disclose truth-
makers of propositions.
However, even philosophers who do not argue that the perceptual
relation ought to be understood in terms of acquaintance have empha-
sised the importance of the perceptual relation for understanding the
nature of perception. Walton (1984), Siegel (2010), Tye (2011) and
INQUIRY 17
Sundberg (2019) talk of ‘perceptual contact’. Schellenberg (2018), simi-
larly, talks of us discriminating and singling out particulars (objects and
property instances) in experience as a result of us being perceptually
related to such particulars. Given that the relation is described as percep-
tual contact, and as a perceptual relation, it might be tempting to interpret
this as referring to a type of relation which is exclusive to perception.
However, this is not something which is explicitly defended in the cited
literature. What would be needed is an argument to the e!ect that the
type of relation involved in perceptual contact/the perceptual relation
is such that it cannot relate cognition in a similar way. What would this
perceptual contact/perceptual relation be, if it is not acquaintance?
One might be tempted to think that perceptual contact/perceptual
relation is a special form of causal relation. However, if a causal relation
is to explain the special way that perception relates us to the world,
then that causal relation has to be something unique to perception.
After all, objects and features in the world cause beliefs and other non-
perceptual states as well. Further, an object, or a feature might cause a
perceptual experience in a scenario where we would hesitate to say
that that subject perceives, i.e. is perceptually related to, that object or
feature. As it is sometimes put: there could be deviant causal chains
(see e.g. Peacocke 1979 and Price 1998). Many suggestions for what
characterises such a ‘non-deviant’ causal chain have been given. Some
have insisted that the right mechanism has to be involved,8 some insist
that the causal relation has to allow for a speci$c function (e.g. playing
a certain role in guiding action),9 and others emphasise a systematic
dependence (e.g. counterfactual dependence),10 while Sundberg (2019)
suggests that the most plausible alternative draws on, and combines,
all three suggestions. Even so, it is not obvious that such a non-deviant
causal chain would be exclusive to perceptual contact, nor is it explicitly
claimed to be so in the cited literature. Pepp (this issue), however, as a
means of answering the question of whether we can see through photo-
graphs and paintings, explicitly discusses ways of distinguishing
perceptual contact from cognitive contact based on various strategies,
e.g. based on phenomenology, based on encapsulation and based on
stimulus-dependence. The $rst and section option link closely with
8Chisholm (1957) defends such an account, and Price (1998) mentions such as an alternative but does
not in the end endorse it.
9See for example Coates (2000), Grice (1961), O’Shaughnessy (1992), Price (1998) and Davies (1983).
10See for example Lewis (1980, 2000), Tye (1982), and Macpherson and Batty (2016) for di#erent versions
of such an account.
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issues in sections 2 and 4 above, respectively; we will now consider
the third.
Two recent defenders of the idea that perception is to be distinguished
from cognition in terms of a speci$c causal relation are Beck (2018), who
holds that the de$ning feature of sense perception is ‘stimulus-depen-
dence’, in the sense of being causally sustained by proximal stimuli,
and Phillips (2019), who argues that the de$ning feature of sense percep-
tion is ‘stimulus-control’. According to Beck, ‘perceptual states are depen-
dent on a stimulus, or are stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive
states are not’ (Beck 2018, 1f.). Similarly, Phillips claims that ‘a process is
perceptual just in case it has the function of producing representations
of environment entities by being causally controlled by those proximal
stimuli that these entities produce’ (Phillips 2019, 7). As Beck (2018, 2f.)
points out, this suggestion has some intuitive appeal. For example, it
o!ers a way of elucidating the way perception is tied to our sensory
organs (on this, see also Phillips 2019, 9f.), and it re"ects the idea that per-
ception is tied to the here-and-now in a way that cognition is not.11
There are, however, at least two challenges for this suggestion, and for
accounts focusing on a world-relation in general: hallucinations and
world-related cognition. Let us consider them in turn.
First, we might want to classify hallucinations as perceptual, rather
than cognitive, mental states. However, a subject who su!ers a hallucina-
tion is not related to an object in the world, so if a world relation is the
de$ning feature of perception, then hallucination cannot be perceptual.
One option is to accept this and embrace disjunctivism. (See section 2
above.) However, a defender of the stimulus-dependence view is not
forced to accept disjunctivism. While it is true that a hallucinatory experi-
ence is not stimulus-dependent, such a mental state could still be the
result of a mechanism with the function to be stimulus-dependent in
the way that is required for perception, as Beck (2018) points out. Simi-
larly, on Schellenberg’s (2018) account, where the de$ning feature of per-
ception is a capacity to discriminate and single out particulars as a result
of being perceptually related to such particulars, Schellenberg argues that
11Strictly speaking, due to the time-lag involved in the processes connecting proximal stimuli to percep-
tual states, and due to the !nite speed of the transfer of energy (e.g. light), perception is perhaps best
understood as a connection to something in the past, i.e., between what is here-and-now and what is
then-and-there (see Suchting 1969 for an early interpretation of the temporal extension of perception
along these lines). Admittedly, the time-lag is much greater for perception of distal stimuli like stars,
but, due to the !nite speed of nerve signals, it is present also for the perceptual processing of proximal
stimuli. Nevertheless, the drift of Beck’s point stands: perception seems tied to a speci!c temporal
location in a way that cognition is not.
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in cases of hallucination the subject employs the same type of capacity,
or, at any rate, the same underlying mechanism, without actually discrimi-
nating and singling out any particular. In the successful case, the mechan-
ism performs according to function, and in the unsuccessful scenario
(hallucination) it malfunctions. The success of this type of response
depends on whether we $nd it plausible that we can individuate mechan-
isms according to these types of functions.
A second challenge concerns whether the world-relation in question is
exclusive to perception. If certain cognitive states are stimulus-dependent
in the way that perception is, then the obtaining of that world-relation is
not su#cient for a state to count as perceptual. With respect to stimulus-
dependence, Beck (2018) grants that certain cognitive states, speci$cally
perceptually grounded demonstrative thoughts, are stimulus-dependent.
Adopting Burge’s (2010a) view of perceptual representation as combing
demonstrative-referential (that) and attributive (red, square) elements,
he nevertheless posits this di!erence: in perception, a function to be
stimulus-dependent applies not only the whole perceptual state and (in
particular) its demonstrative component function but also to its attribu-
tive element; in the demonstrative thought only the demonstrative com-
ponent, not its attributive element, can be assigned such a function.
6. The shape of an account of the perception/cognition
distinction: some options
The preceding sections indicate some of the rich variety of accounts of
the perception/cognition distinction in evidence in recent writings. This
section seeks to map out some of the main dimensions along with
such accounts di!er and distinguishes some general types of approaches.
6.1. What notions of perceptions and cognition are in play?
First, what sorts of categories of perception and cognition are the primary
targets? One broad division here is between the categories of folk psy-
chology and those of cognitive science (experimental psychology, neuro-
science, etc.). The former are personal level; arguably, paradigmatically
conscious; at issue in traditional epistemology, as bearers or providers
of such statuses as justi$cation or reasonability. The latter may be sub-
personal (although need not); are often supposed to leave the question
of consciousness open, if not resolved in the negative; not necessarily
supposed to be either the bearers, or providers, of the epistemic statuses
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familiar from traditional epistemology (though for naturalized epistemol-
ogists, and others, they may of course have important epistemic roles).
An account that limits itself to a#rming phenomenological di!erences
between perception and cognition as discussed in section 2, or to making
phenomenologically based claims about representational di!erences
(e.g. arguments for non-conceptual content based on phenomenological
claims of richness or $neness of grain, cf. section 3) plausibly target folk-
psychological notions. In contrast, views that restrict themselves to posit-
ing di!erences in representational format (e.g. the debate regarding PORs
discussed in section 3.3) or cognitive architecture (section 4) based on
cognitive scienti$c $ndings trade in cognitive scienti$c categories. An
account adverting to stimulus control discussed in section 5 may do so
in the aim of outlining either a folk-psychological, or a cognitive scienti$c,
category of perception.
Substantive issues arise here concerning the relation between the folk
psychological and the cognitive scienti$c categories. Suppose an
account in the $rst instance targets the latter. One option then would
be to hold that the folk psychological distinction(s) fall(s) neatly out of
the cognitive scienti$c one. Another option would be that the folk dis-
tinction should be responsive to whatever is found at the cognitive
scienti$c level, but that this might entail some realignment or reconcep-
tion of the folk notion, say in the form of some conceptual engineering,
or a somewhat revisionary reduction.12 A third option is to regard the
folk level as autonomous (cf., e.g. McDowell 1994). On such a view,
folk psychological notions can be distinguished in terms of, say, phe-
nomenological features or epistemic roles, with no need to await the
results of cognitive scienti$c inquiry. That would raise the prospect
that there being several, non-coinciding perception/cognition-distinc-
tions. This would be a form of pluralism, a type of view to which we
return below.
6.2. States, processes, systems, or capacities
Second, what ontological category of things are the primary targets of the
accounts? Do they, in the $rst instance, aim to distinguish mental
12Carranante (2020) explicitly takes a conceptual engineering approach. She argues that it delivers many
di#erent useful concepts of perception. See also Block (MS, 75–77) for the suggestion that some con-
ceptual engineering might be called for already within cognitive scienti!c approaches to perception,
arguing that the concept of perception may need to be ‘clari!ed’ (as he calls it) to exclude certain
states where imagery superimposes on perception, thereby to preserve a comparative clean joint
with cognition.
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capacities, systems, processes or states? Accounts adverting to phenom-
enology, or to representational format or content, invoke what are usually
considered features of mental states.13 Appeals to cognitive architecture
or a speci$c information processing pro$le meanwhile distinguish mental
capacities or systems. The criterion of stimulus control, as formulated in
Beck (2018) and Phillips (2019), is sometimes applied to processes, some-
times states, and sometimes to either states or processes. The criterion
appeals however to a certain function, viz. of being causally controlled
by certain sorts of input, that arguably is realized by certain systems
that cause and sustain representational states (cf. Beck 2018, 9). Moreover,
the criterion would, at $rst blush anyhow, seem to be compatible with
there being no di!erence, in phenomenal, representational, or intrinsic
characteristics, between perceptual and cognitive states.
How deep the di!erences here run depends however on various
questions about the natures of the features invoked. Representational
formats and contents, for example, are widely supposed to depend, at
least to some extent, on functional role, vis-à-vis sensory inputs, behav-
ioural outputs, and other states, a role that might be held to be
mediated or implemented by mental systems or capacities. The same
might go for phenomenal character, e.g. if it is grounded on represen-
tation (though such views are of course notoriously contested). Thus,
a distinction between sensory and cognitive systems drawn initially in
terms of their information processing pro$le, or stimulus-dependence,
may turn out to have implications for the representational or even
phenomenal characteristics of the psychological states in which they
trade, or vice versa.
At the same time, the choice of primary target along this dimension of
ontological category may turn out to be consequential. On one reading of
the broadly Kantian view o!ered by McDowell (1994, 2013), the more
important di!erences in this terrain are between the faculties of sensibil-
ity and understanding, characterized respectively by receptivity and
spontaneity, rather than among mental states of perception and judge-
ment, in as much as each of the latter depend on the co-operation of
the noted faculties (cf also Montague this issue). On such a view, there
might be no clear representational perception/cognition distinction,
while there still would be a distinction between cognitive and perceptual
capacities.
13To simplify, we do not distinguish between mental states and events here.
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6.3. How many distinctions, and on what ground(s)?
A $nal question concerns: how many distinctions are to be drawn in this
terrain? Is there no interesting or principled distinction between percep-
tion and cognition (eliminationism), or one (monism), or several (plural-
ism)? We have already seen one reason for a form of pluralism, viz. that
cognitive scienti$c and folk psychological distinctions between percep-
tion and cognition may turn out not to coincide. In discussion of the
various features in sections 2–5 above a potential case for eliminationism
may have been found to be brewing in the various doubts, there indi-
cated, concerning whether those features allow for a neat separation of
perception from cognition.
Whether monism, pluralism, or eliminationism is favoured, a key ques-
tion is, of course, on what ground, or grounds, the distinction(s) is (are)
drawn, or denied. Central options here include the various features
reviewed in the previous sections. A rough distinction may be drawn,
moreover, between ‘pure’ views, appealing to one type of feature (say,
representation), and ‘mixed’ views, invoking several.14
Arguments for eliminationism tend to focus on a given type of feature.
Clark (2016), Lupyan (2015), and others defend eliminationism on infor-
mation processing grounds, invoking widespread top-down processing
(cf. also Shea 2015). Such eliminationist arguments, targeting a given type
of feature, need a supposition that a di!erence in respect of that type of
feature is at least necessary for a principled perception/cognition distinction.
That supposition may be called into question from the standpoint of some
mixed views, holding that, although no single feature neatly separates
between perception and cognition, some, tolerably uni$ed cluster of fea-
tures may mark out the one from the other (cf. Taylor 2020). A comprehen-
sive case for eliminationism ought to be mixed in the sense of seeking to
show that there is no principled perception/cognition distinction to be
drawn, either in terms of any single type of feature, or on grounds of any
non-gerrymandered combination of such features.
One route to pluralism is through a mixed view. For example, as noted,
it could be held there are viable distinctions to be drawn at both folk
psychological and cognitive scienti$c levels, on diverse grounds, that
are unlikely to coincide (cf. Carranante 2020). Another form of mixed plur-
alism might be discerned in Burge, who, on the one hand, distinguishes
14The distinction is rough since the individuation of ‘types’ of features here obviously is rough. Besides,
some features are internally diverse. Representation for example covers issues of content as well as of
vehicle.
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perception, as tied to a sense modality, from pre-conceptual cognitions
implicated in planning and navigation, as inter- or amodal (Burge
2010c, 46–47; 2014, 574), and, on the other distinguishes perception, as
non-propositional, from basic perceptually based belief, as propositional
(2014, 575). Pluralism, though, can also be motivated within a pure view.
The pluralism of Phillips (2019), for example, distinguishes a narrower,
modality speci$c, and a broader, modality general, category of percep-
tion, against correspondingly broader and narrower categories of cogni-
tion, where both distinctions rely on a stimulus-control criterion.
Some arguments for monism are pure. Pylyshyn argues early vision – or
‘“vision” in the correct usage’ (Pylyshyn 1999, 405) – is discontinuous from
cognition by virtue of cognitive impenetrability.15 Likewise, Block’s (MS)
contention that perception is constitutively iconic, non-conceptual, and
non-propositional, while cognition constitutively is neither, is, on the
face of it, of the pure variety.16 Monism, though, could also, as suggested,
be defended as a mixed view, e.g. by arguing that the di!erent properties
used to distinguish perception from cognition form a single (arguably
homeostatic) cluster.
The issue here, as some of the above has hinted, connects with the
metaphysics of kinds. Whether there are any principled, interesting dis-
tinctions between perception and cognition obviously depend on what
‘principled, interesting’ requires. Many would agree the distinction
should be in natural kind, in a suitably broad sense that contrasts with
the gruesome, gerrymandered, or entirely conventional (cf. Bird and
Tobin 2017). Yet this broad notion can be variously "eshed out. Should
we expect there to be an essence, perhaps of a relatively simple and
underlying kind, that grounds the other features and roles of perception
and cognition respectively? Or may we expect only a looser cluster of
properties, perhaps homestatically regulated, for each kind (cf. Boyd
1999). On a yet weaker, more abundant, view, such as the promiscuous
realism of Dupré (1993), reality is rife with cross-cutting distinctions that
nevertheless may deserve the title of natural kinds within one or
another of a diverse range of explanatory projects. Although the choice
15In contrast, the claim in Fodor (1983) that perception di#ers from (central) cognition in being modular
is better seen as a mixed view. Although encapsulation (a mode of information processing) is a hall-
mark of modularity, Fodorian modularity includes a cluster of further marks, concerning the format or
contents of outputs, domain speci!city, ontogenesis, etc.
16Though Block certainly thinks these representational features are key to grounding a di#erence in kind
between perception and cognition, he adds that perception, as against cognition, is also characterised
by having a functional role of informing us about the present goings-on in the nearby environment,
and having an appropriate sort of causal relation to the objects they concern (MS, ch. 1). On inspection,
then, his view is not entirely unmixed.
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among such views does not necessarily map in any straightforward way
on to the options we have charted in this section, some prima facie ques-
tions of $t do arise. For example, if kinds need underlying essences, how
would that $t with drawing the distinction in (apparently super$cial) phe-
nomenological terms? If kinds are clusters of properties, should we expect
the distinction to rest on just one respect of psychological di!erence, and
not a mix thereof? If reality is promiscuous about distinctions in kind,
what are the prospect for monism, or even a tightly curtailed form of plur-
alism (and would a promiscuous pluralism make any claims elimination-
ists want to deny)? A view of the perception/cognition distinction
would not, then, a!ord to remain neutral concerning the nature of kinds.
6.4. Closing remarks
This review has, of course, scratched only some upper levels of the soils
and root systems that emerge when we begin to dig into the percep-
tion/cognition distinction. The increased exploration of these issues in
recent years promises to deliver a sharpened sense not only of the struc-
tures and complexities lurking beneath, but also of what fruit and rami$-
cations the distinction can support. As noted at the outset, perception
and cognition have often been assigned sharply di!erent roles, in epis-
temology, theories of mental content, and elsewhere in philosophy. How
those roles interact with the nature of the perception/cognition distinction,
which we have focused on here, is an open question. The interest in the
exploration lies partly in the new light it may throw on these matters.
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